Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

KaLynn Ninow v. William Lowe and Augusta Rose
: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert H. Copier, Attorney for Appellants.
Daniel F. Van Woerkom ; Sandra K. Weeks; Hala L. AFU; Van Woerkom and Weeks; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Ninow v. Lowe and Rose, No. 20050867 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6043

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In the matter of the estate of
Gary G. Pahl, deceased.

WILLIAM LOWE'S REPLY BRIEF

[Ninow v. Lowe II]

Appeal No. 20050867-CA

KaLynn Ninow,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
William Lowe and Augusta Rose,
Respondents and Appellants.

Appeal from a Final Order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis, Former District Judge, Presiding.

DANIEL F. VAN WOERKOM, 8500
SANDRA K. WEEKS, 8491
HALAL.AFU, 8967
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, LC
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee
2975 W. Executive Parkway #414
Lehi UT 84043
Telephone (801) 407-8330

ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for William Lowe
Respondent and Appellant
17 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Telephone (801) 272-2222

)

UTAH

LATE COUR1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

In the matter of the estate of
Gary G. Pahl, deceased.

WILLIAM LOWE'S REPLY BRIEF

[Ninow v. Lowe II]

Appeal No. 20050867-CA

KaLynn Ninow,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
William Lowe and Augusta Rose,
Respondents and Appellants.

Appeal from a Final Order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis, Former District Judge, Presiding.

DANIEL F. VAN WOERKOM, 8500
SANDRA K. WEEKS, 8491
HALAL.AFU,8967
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, LC
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee
2975 W. Executive Parkway #414
Lehi UT 84043
Telephone (801) 407-8330

ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for William Lowe
Respondent and Appellant
17 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Telephone (801) 272-2222

LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
Original Parties [See Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291]:

1.

KaLynn Ninow,
Petitioner,
v.
jL•

William Lowe; %Jm
%J• Augusta Rose; TT## Robert Mortensen; and

^ # Grand Staircase Land Co., a Utah corporation,
Respondents.
Augusta Rose,
Third-party Petitioner,
v.
KaLynn Ninow, vJ • Ryan Pahl, and / • Richard Ninow, and Does I-V,
Third-party Respondents.

Additional party added by the trial court's URCP 42 order [April 15, 2004]
consolidating two shareholder derivative actions during the pendency of the
prior appeal [See Ninow v. Lowe (Estate of Pahl), 2004 UT App. 291, n. 10]:

8

Diamond Fork Land Company, a Utah corporation, as relator in a
shareholder derivative action against KaLynn Ninow to assert the rights of
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., a Utah corporation not a party to this
matter, and as relator in a second shareholder derivative action against Ryan
Pahl to assert rights of Pahl's Land Partnership, not a party to this matter,
[formerly know, inter alia, as GHF Investments or GHF Investment
Partnership], by and through its general partner, Pahl's Salt Palace Loan
Office, Inc., a Utah corporation not a party to this action. Said shareholder
derivate actions brought under Civil Case No. 020908627 and Civil Case
No. 030907064 were ordered consolidated April 15, 2004. (R. 1421-1424).]
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REPLY POINT ONE
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction only over orders appealed.
In her1 brief, appellee KaLynn Ninow argues the April 26,2005, final
order should be "disregarded" as "an anomaly" [Appellee Brief, p. 22] or it
should be "regarded" as "effective." [Appelee. Brief, p. 24]. Appellants are
not challenging that order. Ms. Ninow did not cross-appeal. That order will
stand. It is not being appealed. Since, on its face, is the final and appealable
order disposing of all claims as to all parties, every action taken by the trial
court after April 26,2005, that is being appealed, should now be reversed.
REPLY POINT TWO
The arguments in appellee's brief should be rejected on appeal.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REMOVAL OF LOWE AND ROSE AS

LOAN OFFICE OFFICERS/DIRECTORS SHOULD BE REVERSED.
It was plain error to remove them on August 16, 2005, because they
have a right to serve until their successors, if any, are lawfully qualified.2
1

Ms. Ninow's brief was filed only by her as appellee. Richard Ninow and
Ryan Pahl are respondents to the Third-Party Petition that was reduced to a
judgment as to Richard Ninow and dismissed as to KaLynn Ninow and Ryan
Pahl before being erroneously resurrected in the order of August 16,2005.
2

This appeal involves only trial court activity that occurred after the filing of
Notices of Appeal pertaining to Ninow v. Lowe I DBstate of Pahll. 2004 UT
App. 291. Lowe and Rose own no shares. The May 1, 2003, order affirmed
in that appeal dealt only with share ownership. Their interest was in getting
that order affirmed on appeal as afinalorder before it was expanded to add
language removing them. Since KaLynn Ninow controls less than 51% of
the shares, the remaining share claimants possess an important legal right to
preserve the status quo through passive boycott that thwarts a shareholder
quorum and prevents Lowe and Rosefrombeing removed and/or replaced
unless a court expressly does so in a proper action with the proper parties.
-1-

A.

Removal of Lowe and Rose was plain error. If it was invited, only

Ms. Rose invited the court to err. Therefore, the court should consider
William Lowe's appeal of that error. Since the proposed August 16, 2005,
order was submitted only by Rose, no error was invited by Lowe and his
appeal of that portion of that order is now before this court. Because the
erroneous removal of Lowe and Rose was plain error, it should now be
reversed even if the issue was not preserved by William Lowe. But it was
preserved by him. While Mr. Lowe took no action under URCP 59 or 60 to
further preserve that issue after the August 16, 2005, order, he had, prior
thereto, consistently preserved it by carefully pointing out to the trial court,
that he and Ms. Rose had never been removed and should not be removed.
[inter alia R. 1988 and 1996] The August 16, 2005, order, by implication,
orders that they had not previously been removed by prior shaireholder action
or by the May 1, 2003, finding of undisputed summary judgment fact. But
Mr. Lowe is appealing only the removal itself. The implicit order that there
was no previous removal stands [as res judicata] due to lack of any crossappeal. And the removal was plain error, since [1] while Lowe and Rose are
parties with standing to litigate in a judicial action to remove them, all share
claimants must first be joined in the action, as must the corporation itself,
and their competing claims must first subjected to a final order; and, [2] no
personal jurisdiction has ever been exercised over that corporation so as to
impose the May 1, 2003, judgment affirmed in Ninow v. Lowe I upon that
corporation, and Ms. Ninow still controls only 3000 shares [less than 51%].
3

Ms. Rose submitted the order as a proposed correct recordation of prior
erroneous rulings. The court signed it. The error was a "chain error" that
started when the court erroneously started entering orders post-April 26th.
-2-

B.

The law of the case does not prohibit the consideration of Lowe and

Rose's removal as officers and directors of the Loan Office. Instead, the law
of me case establishes that they were officers and directors until they were
removed in error on August 16, 2005.4 Ms. Lowe's argument that the court
adjudicated the removal of Lowe and Rose as officers and directors in its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Summary Judgment entered
May 1, 2003, was implicitly rejected by the trial court on August 16, 2005,
when she executed their removal that day via judicial order. That very clear
implication within that order is res judicata, and there was no cross-appeal.
Even if Ms. Ninow had cross-appealed, she would have faced tough
sledding challenging the trial court's implicit rejection of her argument that
the May 1, 2003, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Summary
Judgment adjudicated the removal of officers and directors. Findings of fact
entered with a summary judgment order merely memorialize the undisputed
facts. By rule, under URCP 56, thosefindingsare deemed undisputed only
for purposes of the summary judgment order itself. Had Ms. Ninow stated
as an undisputed fact that she controlled 100% of Microsoft shares and had
removed Bill Gates, and had Lowe and Rose not disputed that for strategic
reasons, that "undisputed fact" would have no legal force as an order that
removed Bill Gates and replaced him with KaLynn Ninow, Richard Ninow
and Ryan Pahl, since Microsoft Corporation was not a party. The findings
similarly do not constitute the judicial removal/replacement, by order, of
Lowe and Rose as officers or directors. Thefindingthat they had been
removed and replaced was not challenged in the prior appeal since it was, at
4

That is why the trial court placed them under injunction from time to time.
[Had they not been officers, there would have been no need to enjoin them.]
-3-

best, only a Parduhn v. Bennett5 "subsidiary finding" that had no legal force
or effect as a judicial order. It merely memorialized a fact not disputed for
purposes of the summary judgment. And since the summary judgment order
dealt itself only with shares [and does not remove or replace officers], Lowe
and Rose, who claim no ownership of shares, simply pursued their strategic
goal of getting the May 1, 2003, order affirmed on appeal as a final order in
order to put a stop to vexatious litigation to which they were not the proper
parties and to which Ms. Ninow failed/refused to join Pahl's Salt Palace
Loan Office, Inc., as a party. The trial court implicitly agreed with the
foregoing analysis by removing Lowe and Rose on August 16, 2005. Ms.
Ninow's failure to cross-appeal means this implication is now res judicata.
Mr. Lowe has standing to seek reversal of the challenged portion of
the August 16, 2005, order as to both himself and Ms. Rose, since he has a
^"Because a finding of fact need only be supported by sufficient subsidiary
facts to justify it, one erroneous subsidiary finding does not necessarily
render the ultimate factual finding erroneous as well/9 Pardulm v. Bennett
2005 UT 22,124; 112 P.3d 495. While the finding that Lowe and Rose had
been removed and replaced is erroneous, it is "subsidiary" [if not gratuitous],
and it had nothing to do with the May 1, 2003, order's declaration of share
ownership or the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals in affirming
that order in Ninow v. Lowe TEstate of PahlL 2004 UT App. 291. It did not
need to be challenged in that prior appeal because it creates no judicial order
res judicata, by rule. The trial court, by order of August 16, 2005, implicitly
rejected both the contention that Lowe and Rose had been removed by the
May 1, 2003, "finding" and the contention that the said finding should have
been challenged it in the prior appeal. That August 16, 2005, law of the case
now stands due to the lack of any cross-appeal. As is the case with all of the
controlling authorities cited by the appellants in their opening brief and their
legal analysis presented in their opening brief based upon those controlling
authorities, appellee has neither countered the controlling authorities nor met
that legal analysis. Instead, she attacks the character of appellants' lawyer,
but then fails to analyze the difference between an order and factual finding.
-4-

legitimate interest in having a functioning quorum of a board of directors on
which serves as a director. The portion of the August 16, 2005, order that
removed Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose as officers and directors should be fully
reversed as error, since they have a right to continue to serve as directors
because PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., lawfully rejected shareholder
attempts to remove them through its officer [Lowe], it was not a party, and
no court with personal jurisdiction over the corporation has removed them.6
The status of Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose as the only quorum of directors
with authority over Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and Ms. Ninow's lack of
authority, was put to rest on November 26, 2002. Full reinstatement of the
November 26, 2002 judgment is sought through reversal of an April 6,2005,
ruling on a June 12, 2003, order, so that the matter will be finally put to rest.
But, in any event, KaLynn Ninow, Richard Ninow, and Ryan Pahl
were never directors or officers by virtue of attempts by Ms. Ninow to take
unanimous shareholder action, the May 1, 2003, order did not remove and
6

Mr. Lowe repeatedly gave notice to the trial court and to Ms. Ninow that,
as an officer of the corporation, he had utilized the time between expiration
of the TRO at 11:00 a.m. on May 30, 2002, and the entry of the preliminary
injunction, to duly reject, on behalf of the corporation, Ms. Ninow's attempts
to vote shares. That claim by him will stand until a court that has personal
jurisdiction over the corporation itself litigates his assertion. Any contest
between a shareholder who claims she has removed and replaced a corporate
officer, and that officer who claims that as an officer he rejected that attempt
to remove him and did so on behalf of the corporation, cannot be resolved in
favor of the shareholder until the corporation is joined as a party. Until then,
the officer remains an officer and the shareholder's vote[s] remain[s] a legal
nullity recognized neither by the corporation nor by the Utah courts. Like
most of the issues the remain unadjudicated, all of this will be settled by now
reinstating the November 26,2002, default judgment on appeal. But if that
is not done, then the unadjudicated matters are in need of further lawsuit[s].
-5-

replace officers and directors because it contains no order language doing so,
that order gave her no title to any to any shares free of adverse claims, and it
gave her no voting rights [since PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., is not a
party to that order], all of which is implicit within the trial court's decision to
remove on August 16, 2005, instead of declining to sign the proposed order.
Under that res judicata, the said corporation now has no officers, and
that should be remedied by the Court of Appeals by reversing that portion of
the August 16, 2005, order that removed Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose as officers
and as a quorum of directors so they can now serve until removed either by a
quorum of shareholders or by a proper judicial action with the proper parties.
II.

THIS COURT HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE

APPEALED ORDERS. Appellee argues that since the April 26, 2005,
order was the final, appelalable order that disposed of all claim? as to all
parties, appellants should have appealed from that order, not the later August
16, 2005, order. Appellee's argument has no merit under "law of the case."
By erroneously entering the additional orders after April 26, 2005, the
trial court erroneously turned the April 26, 2005, order into an interlocutory
order by virtue of post-April 26, 2005, law of the case. After the trial court
then [as a "chain-error"] signed another final order on August 16, 2005, filed
on August 19, 2005, appellants, timely, appealed a part of that order as well
as the orders entered prior to August 16,2005, being challenged on appeal.

Something very similar happened with the November 26, 2002, default
judgment. It was a final, appealable order. The URCP 60 motion did not
render it interlocutory and the denial of the URCP 60 motion was itself final
and appealable on the narrow issue of whether the denial was correct. But,
with two final orders in place, the trial court then erroneously entered a June
12, 2003, order that treated the orders as interlocutory under law of the case.
-6-

The time for appealing is computed based on the law of the case as it
exists at the time appellants file their notice of appeal, not on the law of the
case as it will exist after the appellants win that appeal. Appellants are not
required to have the prescience [or arrogance] to appeal based on anything
other than law of the case as it exists at the time they file a notice of appeal.
III.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO RULE THAT

THE MAY 1, 2003, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS JUST A PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Because that ruling did not occur until after
April 26, 2005, it was plain error to enter any ruling. Because a final order
dismissing everything before the court had been entered on April 26, 2005,
the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to enter the sua sponte order turning the
April 26, 2005, final order into an interlocutory order by ruling that the May
1, 2003, summary judgment was a partial summary judgment and that the
May 29, 2002, petition had survived the prior appeal and was still pending.
Also, the May 1, 2003, summary judgment is not a partial summary
judgment under the law of the case. No order on the merits of the May 29,
2002, petition has been entered other than that May 1,2003, order [already
affirmed in Ninow v. Lowe II. The real property issues that Ms. Ninow
attempted to plead in her May 29,2002, petition have, since then, never been
reached in any subsequent order on the merits. Everything was dismissed on
April 26, 2005, and again on August 16,2005, after Ms Ninow abandoned
the issues on April 6, 2005. The erroneous ruling concluding it was only a
partial judgment should be reversed as an improper ruling on a moot issue.
IV.

THE MAY 2003 SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DISPOSITIVE AND

FINAL AS TO OWNERSHIP OF THE LOAN OFFICE SHARES ONLY
AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THAT JUDGMENT. It does not bind
-7-

any persons or entities who were not made parties, it does not vest title in the
shares free of adverse claims and liens, and it does not give Ms. Ninow any
voting rights over shares [because PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., is not
a party to that judgment]. Under relevant law of the case, that judgment is
not dispositive as to the rights of the successor[s] to the parties to the May 1,
2003, judgment. That very important question was duly decided by the trial
court, against Ms. Ninow, when the trial court decided to dismiss Diamond
Fork Land Company without prejudice instead of dismissing with prejudice.
Ms. Ninow did not cross-appeal and that order is res judicata as to the
out-of-state share claimants who may well be awaiting the outcome of this
appeal before reinstating the derivative lawsuit dismissed without prejudice.
IV.

IT WAS PREMATURE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY

LOWE'S MOTION FOR LIABILITY ON THE UNDERTAKING. Mr.
Lowe's motion asked only that the matter be set for hearing and that notice
be given to the surety. That was the proper motion under URCP 65A(c)(3).
The court should have set a hearing, not denied the motion out-ofhand. The court lacked discretion to deny a proper motion for a hearing and,
to the extent it had discretion, that discretion was abused.

Two separate

grounds for giving notice to the surety, so that he can litigate, are apparent.
First, the reasoning under which the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the portion of the contempt order that held Mr. Lowe in contempt
for violating the TRO in Ninow v. Lowe I TEstate of PahlL 2004 UT App.
291, involved scaling-back a TRO that the trial court retroactively extended.
Mr. Lowe was wrongfully restrained as a matter of law under the law
of the case between the time that the trial court retroactively extended the
TRO expiration time to cover conduct he had engaged in reliance on that
-8-

expiration time and the time that the Court of Appeals reversed the order
that had retroactively extended the TRO's expiration time past the stated
time. A second unadjudicated ground for holding a hearing now exists
under the law of the case because the TRO was initially obtained based on
allegations that Mr. Lowe, Ms. Rose, and Robert Mortensen were engaged in
all manner of embezzlement, forgery, and malfeasance and that "irreparable
harm" would be imminent if the TRO was not entered restraining them from
acting in their offices as Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., officers and
directors. No subsequent order on the merits has ever established any such
misconduct on their part and the tribunal that hears the TRO undertaking
matter might find from this that Mr. Lowe was wrongfully restrained, since a
dispute over share ownership and real estate did not require any TRO. In
fact, it would have been far better to leave the officers and directors of the
corporation free from restraint/injunction and join the corporation as a party,
so that the merits, rather than injunctions and contempt, could be litigated.
It was premature to deny the request for a TRO undertaking hearing,
and the matter should now be remanded with an order to hold the hearing.
VI.

THIS COURT HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW

THE JUNE 12, 2003, ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE NOVEMBER 26,
2002, DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND SHOULD REVERSE THE ORDER.
A.

Lowe and Rose have standing to appeal the April 6, 2005, denial of

their motion to vacate the June 12, 2003, order. As non-shareholders, Lowe
and Rose had no standing to initially participate in the shareholder derivative
action. But once a final and appealable judgment in favor of Diamond Fork
Land Company as relator for Pahl's Salt Palace Loan was entered against
KaLynn Ninow, and they relied upon it after the 3-month 60(b) deadline
-9-

elapsed, they gained such standing. They are expressly named in the
judgment and personally relied upon it. When they were made parties to
this proceeding, over their objection, through consolidation, they properly
answered the complaint and also joined in the motion9 to vacate. [R. 1634]
This court has jurisdiction on appeal over the November 26, 2002,
default judgment because denial of the motion to vacate the June 12, 2003,
order that set it aside was made in an interlocutory minute entry on April 6,
2005, that is part of the current appeal. The trial court had jurisdiction to
grant or deny the motion on April 6, 2005, reverse the June 12, 2003, order,
and reinstate the November 26, 2002, default judgment. The June 12, 2003,
sua sponte order that set aside the November 26, 2002, default judgment did
so without addressing the question of whether Ms. Ninow had shown any
defense of at least ostensible merit. The trial court, at a minimum, should
have vacated the June 12, 2003, order on April 6, 2005, and granted leave to
Ms. Ninow to make such a showing. Since we now have the benefit of a
subsequent trial court order, we now know that the sole defense raised by
Ms. Ninow, that of preclusion, lacks merit under res judicata. The trial
court dismissed Diamond Fork Land Company without prejudice instead of
with prejudice. Ms. Ninow has not cross-appealed. This ground, preserved
at [R. 1634], is a sufficient basis for now reversing the April 6, 2005, denial.
8

While their personal reliance on the November 26, 2002, judgment gives
them personal standing, they also relied upon it as the corporate officers.
9

Because Diamond Fork Land Company was dismissed without prejudice on
its own motion only after consolidation, that was not a final order as to all
claiijis and parties and Lowe and Rose could join in the motion to vacate.
The trial court never ruled that they could not do so. Instead, on April 6,
2005, it denied the motion vacate in which they had joined and advocated.
-10-

B.

Diamond Fork Land Company and/or its successors can still litigate

ownership of Loan Office shares but do not need to do so yet and can wait to
see if this court reverses the June 12, 2003, order and can wait to see if the
November 26, 2002, judgment is reinstated and can then decide whether it is
necessary to litigate the original shareholder derivative action. Dismissal
without prejudice, therefore, did not conclude a major phase in the probate.
And it did not conclude the shareholder derivative action because the
court had not ruled on the motion to set aside the June 12, 2003, order and
the court did not rule on that until April 6, 2005. That April 6, 2005, minute
entry ruling was not reduced to an order that could have been appealed prior
to the time that the court signed its final order on the May 29, 2002, petition
on August 16, 2005, under law of the case. That final order was appealed.
Law of the case created by a court governs all parties. There was no
basis in Utah law for appealing a dismissal of Diamond Fork Land Company
"without prejudice" on its own motion within 30 days of its entry. Instead,
the issue of setting aside the default judgment was duly preserved by Lowe
and Rose when they joined the motion to vacate the June 12, 2003, order
setting aside the default judgment. The court denied Lowe and Rose's
motion on April 6, 2005. Both Lowe and Rose have standing and both
Lowe and Rose appealed this issue in their opening brief. And appellee's
footnote 4 on page 32 of her brief discussing that this issue was raised in the
docketing statement by Ms. Rose and is raised on appeal by both appellants
does not advance the analysis, as both gained standing once the November
26, 2002, judgment was entered and they reasonably relied upon it after the
3 month 60(b) deadline passed. The trial court denied their motion to vacate
the June 12, 2003, order on April 6, 2005, implying that they had standing.
-11-

It is to be noted that Diamond Fork Land Company is not a party to
this appeal. It, and/or its successors], can still sue over share ownership.10
Lowe and Rose would have been laughed out of the appellate court if
they had tried to appeal a dismissal without prejudice and would have been
told to go back and get a final order on the motion to vacate a June 12, 2003,
order that was referred in Ninow v, Lowe L that had still not been ruled on,
and was not ruled on until April 6, 2005. Yet, appellee argues in her brief,
apparently with a straight face, that a 30-day appeal deadline applied to that.
VIL THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE REVERSED AS PLAIN ERROR MADE WITHOUT JURISDICTION,
a.

This court cannot affirm the setting aside of the default judgment

on June 12, 2003, on a ground not raised by motion below or on a ground
that could have been raised below by a timely motion filed under URCP
60(b)(1), (2), or (3). The general appellate proposition that an appellate
court can sustain any order on any ground[s] does not apply when the
appellate court lacks jurisdiction to do so and when the error by the trial
court, as in this case, was jurisdictional. The June 12, 2003, order rules that
motions that could be brought under 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) are all time-barred.
10

Unlike Lowe and Rose, who did not oppose the undisputed facts that gave
rise to the May 1, 2003, judgment because they do not claim ownership of
shares and because they strategically wanted to get a final order as soon as
possible that did as little damage to their interests as possible, relators in a
future shareholder derivative action would likely oppose those facts with Mr.
Lowe's affidavit, filed below, that both the May and December agreements
were accelerated and Gary Pahl transferred 3000 shares to the corporation in
exchange for its unsecured obligation. At a minimum, a jury trial would be
required. Ms. Ninow has produced nothing to counter Mr. Lowe's affidavit
and, in a future shareholder derivative action, the court could not weigh Mr.
Lowe's credibility and the matter would proceed to a jury trial of the issue.
-12-

That part of the order is not being appealed. Once the trial court had ordered
Ms. Ninow's URCP 60 motion to set aside the November 26, 2002, denied
on May 2, 2003, it thereafter lacked jurisdiction to grant sua sponte relief
under 60(b)(6), since Ms. Ninow did not then file a motion under URCP
60(b)(6) after her motion was ordered denied under URCP 60(b). A trial
court lacks any jurisdiction to grant URCP 60(b) relief sua sponte without
having any motion to do so before it. The appellate court also lacks appeal
jurisdiction to grant any relief sua sponte and only has jurisdiction to now
reverse the June 12, 2003, order. Moores Federal Practice 3d, Sec. 60.62.
b.

To the extent the default judgment exceeds the scope of the relief

prayed for in the complaint, it is not void, but is "voidable." A "voidable"
judgment is effective until voided by grant of a timely motion under URCP
60(b)(1), (2), or (3). The trial court properly ruled on June 12,2003, that
relief that could have been obtained under URCP 60(b)(1), (2) or (3) is not
available to Ms. Ninow. Ninow did not cross-appeal so as to challenge that
ruling. The appellate court cannot grant such relief to her sua sponte. Id.
c.

Ninow's interest to and title in the Loan Office shares was never

reached or attached by Lowe and Rose because they claim no interest in any
of the Loan Office shares. Their personal interest is in setting aside a default
judgment that impacts their rights and on which they had reasonably relied.
There has been no order, finding, or showing that Ms. Ninow even
possesses the share certificate issued by the corporation for the said 3000
shares. Nor has there been any order, finding, or showing that a bearer
certificate for the 3000 shares is not held out-of-state by a third part[ies].
Ms. Ninow's focus on the physical share certificate also misses the
-13-

legal significance of the default judgment as a shareholder "derivative"
judgment. It is the corporation itself that has the right to designate its
shareholders [subject to being overruled by a court with jurisdiction over
the corporation], and whereabouts of the physical share certificate is of no
consequence in a shareholder derivative judgment in which the rights of the
corporation itself are adjudicated. Ms. Ninow had to defend the lawsuit, not
default and then try to argue erroneously on appeal about a stock certificate.
d.

In this case, the court clerk signed the default certificate but did

not enter it on the computer docket. There has been no showing of whether
or not this is standard practice as to all default certificates or whether this
was an omission by the clerk. The court ruled on June 12, 2003, [R. 2012]
that the clerk signed the default certificate on November 25, 2002, the day
before the default judgment was entered on November 26, 2002. Ms. Ninow
argues that there was no default certificate at all. That is contrary to the law
of the case in the ruling. That law of the case is not being appealed and Ms.
Ninow did not cross-appeal. Once the default judgment itself was entered,
that superceded any and all irregularities regarding the default certificate.
Any issue about the absence of a computer docket entry recording
the signing of the default certificate on November 25, 2002, should have
been raised under URCP 60(b)(l), (2), or (3), within the 3 month time limit.
e.

The trial court's setting aside of the default judgment should be

reversed because it was plain error in law under URCP 60. The case of
Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46, 63 P.3rd 1008.
was relied upon by appellee. It is distinguishable. That case turns upon its
own unique procedural facts [See Swart v. State, 2004 UT App 209] and the
majority and the dissent are in both in accord with well-settled Utah law and
-14-

well-settled precedent from FRCP 60(b) cases, which holds that 60(b)(6)
relief cannot be granted when any unexcused lack of due diligence can be
detected. That case turned on whether or not Ms. Oseguera had lacked due
diligence and whether she was "affirmatively misled" so as to excuse such
lack of due diligence. The "unique procedural facts" of Oseguera are light
years away from the facts of the case at bar. Here, Ms. Ninow would have
known she had filed her responsive motion well past the time stated in the
summons had she been duly diligent. Due diligence would therefore have
included checking for a default judgment. And there is no finding that she
did not receive the Notice of Judgment in time to meet the 3-month deadline
The June 12, 2003, order is erroneous because, while it does attempt
to excuse some of the lack of diligence [she missed the 3-month deadline by
a "relatively short time"], the trial court failed identify and dispose of some
obvious unexcused lack of due diligence that bars relief under 60(b)(6) and
thus the court abused its discretion by granting relief under URCP 60(b)(6).
But before one even reaches those issues, one reaches a jurisdictional
bar. Once the court denied the URCP 60(b) motion, there was no basis in
law on which to then grant sua sponte relief under URCP 60(b), since Ms.
Ninow was first required to file another motion to obtain any such relief.11
While the court could grant relief under URCP 55 or URCP 60(a) sua
sponte, it did not do so. This court lacks grounds and jurisdiction to do so.12
11

"Rule 60(b) contemplates relief only 4on motion.'" "[A] court may not
grant relief under Rule 60(b) sua sponte." Moores Federal Practice 3d, Sec.
60.62. Identical "on motion" language is found in URAP 22(b)(2). The
judges of this appellate court don't grant enlargements of time sua sponte.
12

URCP 55 no longer applies since the default judgment itself was entered.
No URCP 60(a) "clerical" errors are present. Entering a default when no
-15-

The November 26, 2002, default judgment was the final, appealable
order that was not appealed within 30 days. When the court denied the Rule
60 motion on May 2, 2003, that was a final appealable order on which Ms.
Ninow could have appealed within 30 days on the narrow issue of denial of
her motion. Instructing the parties to brief URCP 55 and 60(a) did not turn
the November 26,2002, judgment, or, May 2, 2003, order, into interlocutory
orders. A URCP 60 motion does not extend the appeal time or change the
finality of a final order. URAP 4(b). Therefore, on June 12, 2003, the trial
court could not revisit its May 2,2003, order that had denied the motion
under URCP 60(b). That was a final order. Thus, Thurston v. Box Elder
County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) and Tremblev v. Mrs. Fields Cookies,
884 P.3d 1306 (Utah App. 1994), provide no basis revisiting it. Instead, as
was pointed out in the motion to vacate the June 12,2003, order in which
Lowe and Rose joined, preserving that issue, the trial court lacked any
jurisdiction to enter the June 12, 2003 order. Those two cases involve the
ability of a trial court to change its mind under URCP 54(b) prior to the
entry of a final order. Reliance on P & B. Land v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d
274, 277 (Utah App. 1988), was also error. There was no default in law or
fact in that case and there was no entry of default prior to the entry of default
judgment. In the case now at bar there was a default in both law and fact
when Ms. Ninow failed to plead or otherwise defend within the time set
forth in the summons and then, several days later, upon application for a
default and judgment, the clerk signed the default certificate on November
responsive motion has made it into the file is not 60(a) "clerical" error even
if a motion is filed the same day and it is not in the file through no fault of a
movant. Signing a default judgment you would not have signed if you had
known all the foregoing is not 60(a) "clerical" error. Both are 60(b) issues.
-16-

25,2002. After judgment was entered on November 26,2002, Ms. Ninow
could have appealed within 30 days or filed her motion under URCP
60(b)(1), (2) or (3) within 3 months. And even in cases where there is no
default in law or fact, under P & B Land the judgment is "illegal and
"voidable" and is not "illegal and void." It was error for the trial court to
conclude that it "makes no sense" not to void such a judgment if the
defendant "did not comply strictly with the three month deadline." It
"makes sense" to the courts that have made the settled and controlling
precedent that the 3-month deadline is jurisdictional. It was also error to
excuse Ms. Ninow because she missed the 3-month motion deadline by a
"relatively short time." No jurisdictional bar known to law has that wiggle
room, especially when third parties [Lowe and Rose] rely on the deadline.
VIII.

THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS. Starting on May 20,

2002, with the entry of an ex parte TRO, Ms. Ninow engaged Ms. Lowe and
Ms. Rose in years of litigation in which she never obtained any order on the
merits to which Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose were proper parties until August
16, 2005. Instead, Ms. Ninow has engaged in attempts to retroactively
impose injunctions [the last one was lifted August 16, 2005] and endless
serial contempt motions, which were finally disposed of on April 26, 2005.
The final order, on the merits, signed on August 16, 2005, is the first
order on the merits in which Lowe and Rose actually have a recognizable
interest [since it removes them as officers and directors of Pahl's Salt Palace
13

There is no finding that Ms. Ninow's counsel did not receive the notice of
judgment in time to meet the 3-month deadline. The negligently tardy filing
is a jurisdictional bar. No exceptional circumstances completely beyond Ms.
Ninow's control taking this from 60(b)(l)-(3) to 60(b)(6) are in the record. A
basis for 60(b)(6) relief is not present. Moores Federal Practice 3RD 60.48,
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Loan Office, Inc.], and it was, at long last, signed on August 16,2005, and
entered on August 19, 2005. But it was error to remove them. That order
was timely appealed. That appeal is before this court and it is not frivolous.
The August 16, 2005, judicial removal of Lowe and Rose as officers and
directors constitutes both an implicit order, by the trial court, that they had
not theretofore been removed [either by judicial finding or shareholder
action] and an order that judicially removes them by order. Mr. Lowe is not
appealing the implicit order that he and Ms. Rose had never been removed
prior thereto. He appeals only the portion of the order that removes them.
The basis for assigning error to that removal order is: [1] Under both
Utah law and the articles and bylaws of PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc.,
Rose and Lowe have a right to serve as the directors until their successors
are qualified and no successors have ever been qualified by a shareholder
action or the judicial finding, which is implicit in the judicial removal of
Lowe and Rose by order on August 16, 2005. [2] After April 6, 2005, the
only issues that remained before the trial court were the contempt motions.
The trial court had jurisdiction only to find, or decline to find, parties in
contempt, and if found to be in contempt, to limit remedies to those available
for contempt. [3] After April 26, 2005, the court had no jurisdiction to enter
any orders at all other than to dismiss any further contempt motions under
res judicata. [4] It was error to remove directors without joining PahPs Salt
Palace Loan Office, Inc., as a party. [5] Since the shareholder derivative
action was dismissed without prejudice, it was very premature to remove
directors without awaiting a final order in a shareholder derivative action or
an action brought by Ms. Ninow against the corporation in which Lowe and
Rose were freed from injunction and could direct its defense as corporate
-18-

officers; [6] Since the November 26, 2002, default judgment had divested
title to 3000 shares from Ms. Ninow and had judicially vested it in out-ofstate owners, the June 12, 2003, order setting aside the November 26, 2002,
judgment did not place the 3000 shares back under Ms. Ninow's control.14
She currently controls owns the legal voting title to only 3000 shares
[50%], she cannot, unilaterally, convene a shareholder quorum and act, and
her sole remedy, if any, is to file a shareholder derivative action of her own
or to sue the corporation. But she should wait to do so until this appeal is
decided. If the Court of Appeals reverses the trial court's April 6, 2005,
denial of the motion to vacate the June 12, 2003, sua sponte order, then the
November 26, 2002, judgment will be res judicata that fully precludes her.
A.

Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose did not submit an order on a petition in which

they had no interest and then appeal from the order claiming error. Mr.
Lowe did not submit the order. Ms. Rose submitted it as a proposed correct
recordation of prior erroneous trial court rulings, and the trial court signed it.
Ms. Rose clearly had an interest in obtaining that order once the trial court,
in error, started entering erroneous post-April 26, 2005, rulings and orders.
B.

Lowe and Rose clearly have an interest in the Diamond Fork default

judgment and therefore continue to advocate reversing the April 6, 2005,
14

The trial court had jurisdiction to move title to the shares out-of-state on
November 26, 2002, [because a probate court in which Ms. Ninow was the
fiduciary had ruled they were in the estate] but it then lost in rem jurisdiction
as soon as it did so. As a result, setting aside the default judgment on June
12, 2003, did not vest the title to the shares back in Ms. Ninow. Title
remains vested to this day in non-party out-of-state share owners or their
out-of-state successors. There is no basis under Utah probate law for
removing officers/directors since Ms. Ninow lost title to 3000 shares. The
dismissal without prejudice of the shareholder derivitaive action is now res
judicata as to standing of out-of-state owners and absence of preclusion.
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order that denied their motion to vacate the June 12, 2003, sua sponte order
that set it aside. They had no interest in the shareholder derivative action
because they are not shareholders and have no kind of connection with or
control over Diamond Fork Land Company. They serve at the pleasure of
the shareholders, but have a right to continue to serve until their successors
are qualified. Once the lawsuit was reduced to judgment on November 26,
2002, and the 3-month deadline for moving to set it aside under URCP 60(b)
(1), (2) or (3), elapsed, they reasonably relied upon it, it names them, and it
impacts their right to act as officers and a quorum of directors of PahPs Salt
Palace Loan Office, Inc., the corporation whose rights were vindicated in the
shareholder derivative judgment, and so they gained an interest and standing
once the action was reduced to a judgment and they reasonably relied on it.
C.

Rose is not attempting to recover on the TRO undertaking. Lowe

moved the trial court to set a hearing and give notice to the surety so the
surety could litigate the matter. The court lacked discretion to refuse that.
D.

There is no basis for awarding fees for failure to observe appellate

briefing requirements. Counsel for appellants has successfully briefed cases
in which he has gained appellate reversals for clients in the Utah Supreme
Court, in the Utah Court of Appeals, and in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. It is counsel's practice to rely upon the clerks
of the appellate courts to "checklist" his briefs for compliance with appellate
briefing requirements and he often has appellate clerks do that before he
even takes the brief to Kinkos for copying. As to the substantive matters in
the brief, the limit of the May 1, 2003, order affirmed in the prior appeal is a
fairly straightforward matter of parties and preclusion. As to Ms. Ninow's
literary criticism of writing style as "convoluted, verbose, rambling, and an
-20-

incredibly tedious read," counsel has reread his brief and he personally finds
it to be clear, orderly, and cogent. As one who has written professionally as
aDeseret Morning News staff writer, was the Commerce Editor for Utah
Holiday Magazine, and still writes under pen names in Utah publications,
counsel welcomes literary criticism, but adversarial litigation is probably not
the best place to find it. In an interesting twist, at the same time counsel was
reading the literary criticism proffered by the appellee, the Deseret Morning
News reprised an article he wrote 25 years ago on the 25 anniversary of its
publication, deeming it noteworthy enough to be a "week in . . . history."15
REPLY POINT THREE
Appellee's brief is frivolous, warranting attorney fees and costs.
Litigation conducted prior to the notices of appeal16 in Ninow v. Lowe
I rEstateofPahTK 2004 UT App. 291 is not before the court. There is no
need to re-plow that ground and appellee's brief is frivolous in doing so.
Since Judge Medley's dismissal without prejudice of Diamond Fork
Land Company is now res judicata, binding on Ms. Ninow, establishing that
Ninow v. Lowe I TEstate of PahTL 2004 UT App. 291, neither precludes nor
binds Diamond Fork Land Company or its successors and that they have the
standing to sue derivatively if they care to, appellee's brief frivolous in that

15

Difficulty in comprehension sometimes has more to do with the reader than
the writer. It is perhaps revealing that a litigant who never joined Pahl's Salt
Palace Loan Office, Inc., as a necessary and indispensable party and thought
she could get judicial relief on the merits by filing contempt motions now
also discloses she had difficulty grasping the legal concepts of this appeal.
16

Ninow v.Lowe I consolidated two appeals, Nos. 20030169 and 20030458.
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it argues unadjudicated matters yet to be litigated between proper parties.
Appellee's brief is frivolous because the entire brief fails to draw any
distinctions between appellants Lowe and Rose as between themselves, their
counsel, and entities that are not parties to this appeal. There is no factual
basis upon which to lump them together and her attempts to do so on appeal
are a frivolous continuation of her all attempts to do so in the trial court that
were rejected in the April 26, 2005, order. Ms. Ninow did not cross-appeal.
Ms. Ninow's attempt to "certify" in her brief that she never saw the
April 26, 2005, order is frivolous. This appellate court is not equipped to
adjudicate such a factual representation. To "certify" a fact to an appellate
court that is not in the record is frivolous. A direct appeal from a trial court
is not a matter in which an appellate court decides facts not in the record.
Appellee's brief is frivolous because it tries to attack the character of
appellants' counsel, attempts to attribute to appellants' counsel positions
never taken by appellants' counsel, and does so without reference to the trial
court record. The Utah State Bar's emphasis on civility and professionalism
is encouraging to the dwindling few of us who remember the days when the
Utah State Bar was a small but lively group of smart men and women who
got together for law and motion calendars, and who disliked having to start
dealing with lawyers who we did not even know because they were being
pumped out of the two law schools in Utah in ever-increasing numbers.
Ms. Ninow's brief argues matters to be litigated in derivative actions in
the event this court does not reverse the June 12, 2003, sua sponte order.
This is not the proper forum. The issue since the preliminary injunction was
entered on May 31,2002, has been appellants' "purported right.. .to continue
to operate this business." [Medley, J; T.64, Par. 24-25, 5/31/02], That issue
was not concluded until August 16, 2005, by judicial removal that was error.
-22-

Standards of professionalism prevent the undue annoyance of having
an adversary attributes positions to you that you have never taken. Diamond
Fork Land Company duly acquired its interest in 1500 shares through Grand
Staircase Land Company, which had acquired shares from Augusta Rose and
Robert Mortensen in arms-length transactions at the time they were both the
recognized record shareholders because no court had exercised personal
jurisdiction over the corporation as a party so as to change its shareholder
records. And the transaction occurred prior to the time that Augusta Rose
retained Robert Henry Copier as her legal counsel. Appellee's inappropriate
personal attacks in her brief such as "(t)he "Diamond Fork case was clearly a
sham from its inception" [Appellee Brief, p. 44] is not supported by any
finding by Judge Lubeck or Judge Hilder, who had the case before it was
consolidated, or Judge Medley or Judge Lewis, who adjudicated it after it
was consolidated into the probate proceeding now on appeal. The fact that
Judge Medley dismissed the case without [not with] prejudice means that
Diamond Fork Land Company and/or its successors can still pursue that
litigation if they care to and the May 1, 2003, summary judgment that was
affirmed on appeal in Ninow v. Lowe I [Estate of PahlL 2004 UT App. 291,
will not have any preclusive effect barring that, since Judge Medley ruled
against Ms. Ninow on that point when he declined to dismiss with prejudice.
Accusing one's opposing counsel of a "sham" is an attack on that
counsel's character. Equally offensive as [well as clearly incorrect] is Ms.
Ninow's unsupported assertion that "Lowe and Rose continued to litigate
the probate case . . . even though they expressly disclaimed any ownership in
the real estate." [Appellee Brief, p. 44]. First of all, they claim no personal
fee ownership, but Mr. Lowe does claim that interests in real estate were
-23-

pledged by PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., as sole partner in PahPs
Land Partnership [fka, inter alia, GHF Investment Partnership] to secure all
of his attorney fees in dealing with Ms. Ninow. That claim has never been
adjudicated. Second, their participation in the attempts by Ms. Ninow to
litigate real estate claims after May 1, 2003, was to demonstrate that no
order on the merits as to any such claims could be entered because [1] the
May 29, 2002, petition had not survived the May 1, 2003, final order; [2]
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., which was the sole surviving partner of
GHF Investment Partnership, aka, inter alia, Pahl's Land Partnership, had
not been joined as a necessary/indispensable party; and, [3] because neither
the earlier summary judgment "finding" nor any attempted "unanimous
shareholder action" had removed Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose as the officers and
directors, sundry Pahl family members lacked any authority, no one with any
standing was litigating, and title should be quieted against them. No court
order was ever entered adjudicating any of those issues, which were mooted
when Ms. Ninow announced to the trial court on April 6, 2005, that she was
no longer attempting to obtain a court order on any of the real estate claims.
CONCLUSION
The April 6, 2005, ruling denying the motion to vacate the June 12,
2003, order should be reversed.

Everything done between April 26, 2005,

and August 16, 2005, should be reversed. Removal of Lowe and Rose by

18

In this case, third-parties who relied on the 3-month 60(b) deadline were
made parties over their objection and then joined in the motion to vacate a
sua sponte order entered after that deadline. If reversal of that order is not
granted in this appeal, then URCP 60(b)(l)-(5) might as well be repealed,
leaving 60(b)(6) as the rule under which trial judges can vacate any final
judgment at any time, sua sponte, based on what "makes no sense" to them,
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judicial order on August 16,2005, should be reversed.19 The April 6, 2005,
ruling denying a TRO undertaking hearing should be reversed. Appellants
should be awarded attorney fees/costs. Appellee's brief should be stricken.
The court should expressly state that the April 26, 2005, order stands.
SIGNATURE OF COUNSEL
By this signature, counsel certifies that this is the reply brief of client
William Lowe in his individual and personal capacity only and not in any
representative capacity or in concert with any other person or entity. He
further certifies that it is filed only by and on behalf of said client. It is not
made on behalf of, or binding upon, any other persons or entities, except that
William Lowe adopts by this reference all^f ^Vugusta Rose's Reply Brief, in
its entirety, into this Reply Brief, pursuant to
Augusta Rose has similarly adopted everything
DATED THIS ^ 6 DAY OF JUNE,

with no opportunity for any appellate review. What "makes no sense" to
appellants is the conclusion in the June 12, 2003, order, that when the clerk
signed the default certificate on November 25, 2002, a responsive motion
was not in the court file through no fault of Ms. Ninow. She was in charge
of responding to the summons. No application for default would have been
made had she timely responded. Whether tardiness was Ms. Ninow's or her
counsel's is completely irrelevant Moores Federal Practice 3rd 60.48(4)(b),
19

The remainder of the August 16, 2005, order remains for lack of a crossappeal. The entire order appears to be erroneous, but it is erroneous due to
two "chain errors" that began when the court set aside the default judgment
on June 12, 2003, and then entered orders after the April 26,2005, dismissal.
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June 1,2002
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc,
1588 South State Street
Salt Lake City UT 84115
Re: Shareholder Notice and Demand
To whom it may concern:
You are hereby notified to update the shareholder records of the corporation to reflect
transfer on June 1, 2002, of 1500 shares from Augusta Rose to Grand Staircase Land
Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, SLC UT 84111, and of 1500 shares from
Robert K. Mortensen to Grand Staircase Land Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200
SLC UT 84111, with the latter 1500 shares being held in escrow by William Lowe, 3939
Alberly Way SLC UT 84124, for Grand Staircase Land Company. The beneficial owner
of the 1500 shares held in escrow by William Lowe for Grand Staircase Land Company is
Diamond Fork Land Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, SLC UT 84111. Both
new shareholders demand that you act to vindicate your rights as to claims by KaLynn
Ninow, the personal representative of the estate of Gary G. Pahl, that she owns 3000
shares that were held by William Lowe and as to which Gary G. Pahl transferred all his
right, title, and interest to the corporation's treasury before he died, trespass by KaLynn
Ninow, Ryan Pahl, Richard Ninow, and others upon the corporation's property, the
conversion of its property to their own use, their acting without authority as to the real
property and real estate owning partnerships in which the corporation is sole surviving
general partner, and unauthorized transfer of corporate funds to their probate counsel.
shareholder derivative action may follow after 9€Tclays if sufficient action is not taken.

}fgQPJER, R^gisteped Agent
Staircase LaruKfompany
and Diaimmd Fork Land Company

FIUD DISTRICT COUfiT
ROBERT H. COPIER, 727
Attorney for Relator
200 Metro Place
243 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2803
Telephone 531-7^23

Third Judicial D*tnot
NOV 2 6
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rN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
rN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation,
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
KALYNN NINOW, personal
representative of the estate of
Gary O. Pahl, deceased,

Civil No. 020908627
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

Defendant.
Defendant's default having been entered, the court now grants default
judgment, and hereby, ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES, as follows:
1. All of defendant's claims to 3000 shares (50%) of the stock of Pahl's
Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc , a Utah corporation, are hereby extinguished and the
legal and beneficial title to the said 3000 shares is hereby quieted in favor of the
plaintiffs successors to those shares as set forth in the case record, as follows.
Bangkok Birth Mothers Basic Education Trust ISQ0 shares (2S%)
(With Bangkok Birth Mothers Trust for
Equity and Justice as the beneficial owner)
Bangkok Birth Mothers Advocacy Trust
IS00 shares (1S%)
(With Diamond Fork Land Company, a
Utah corporation, as the beneficial owner)

• i
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2. No other or further writ or order shall be required and this default
judgment fully adjudicates any claims between the parties as to the 3000 shares
andftiltyand finally quiets the ownership of the 3000 shares as set forth above.
3. (n the event that plaintiff or any of plaintiffs successors to the 3000
shares shall deem it necessary to have defendant reasonably execute papers or
documents to vindicate and protect therightsof plaintiffs successors to the 3000
shares, defendant is hereby ORDERED to sign all such papers and documents.
4. As to the second claim for relief in the First Amended Complaint, it is
hereby decreed that any and all acts,filings*and transactions purportedly made or
entered into by or on behalf of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., after the death
of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this judgment, as well as any actions that were
purportedly made or entered into by unanimous action of shareholders or by a
quorum of shareholders after the death of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this
judgment, which have not been expressly approved or ratified by a board of
directors upon which Augusta Rose and William Lowe served as directors, are
declared and decreed to be unauthorized, of no force or effect, and void ab mmo.
5. It is further decreed that no action, tiling, or transaction purportedly
made or entered into by or on behalf of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., from
and after the date of this judgment shall have any force or effect unless approved
or ratified by a board of directors upon which William Lowe and Augusta Rose
serve as directors, until such time us their successors, if any, are duly qualified,
6. The third claim for relief is dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE,
DATED THIS J j ^ D A Y OF NOVEMBER*<am^
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY vs.

DOES I-V

.SE NUMBER 020908627 Contracts

'RRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
ROBERT K. HILDER
.RTIES
Plaintiff - PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
Represented by: ROBERT H COPIER
Plaintiff -

DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY

Defendant - KAYLYN NINOW
Defendant -

DOES I-V

'COUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

140.00
140.00
0.00
0.00

Amount. Due
Amount Paid
Credit
Balance

REVENUE DETAIL

TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Amount Due:
140 .00
140 .00
Amount Paid:
0 .00
lount Credit:
0 .00
Balance:

.SE NOTE
.OCEEDINGS
-03-02
-03-02
-03-02
-03-02
-03-02
-04-02
'-07-02
-18-02
-24-02

Case filed by karries
Judge LUBECK assigned.
Filed: Complaint
No Amount
Fee Account created
Total Due:
140.00
COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Payment Received:
140.00
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Filed: First Amended Complaint
Judge HILDER assigned.
Filed: Share Transfer Notice
Filed return: Summons

•inted: 11/29/02 13:48:57
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karries
karries
karries
karries
karries
bryanp
dpx
bryanp
bryanp

E NUMBER 020908627 Contracts
Party Served NINOW, KAYLYN
Service Type Personal
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAUL'S SALT PLACE LOAN
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation,
ex Ml- DIAMOND LAND FORK
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs\
KAYLYNN N1NOW, personal
representative of the estate of
(Jury <V\ Pah I, deceased, and
individually,

Case No. 020908627

Judge Robert K. ITilder

Defendant,

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is before the court for decision, The
parties briefed the original Motion, and the court heard argument, at which time the court
indicated that it believed a Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Motion was time barred,
but that there might be grounds to sot aside the judgment under Rule 60(a), or even under Rule
55, the underlying basis for a default judgment, pursuant to P & B Land v. Klungervik, 751 P,2d
274 (Ut. App. 1988), The parties were requested to submit supplemental briefs addressing the
issue raised by the court. Now, having reviewed the briefs and the applicable law, the court rules
as follows;
Firsl, the court must exercise its option under Thurston v. Box Elder County and Trembly
v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, to reconsider its previous decision regarding Rule 60(b), because the
coiut is persuaded that it was in error as to the law, and no final judgment has entered based on
the court's bench ruling of May 2,2003.
That ist the court is still persuaded that as to any Motion based on subsections (1), (2) or
(3) of Rule 60(b), including motions under 60(b)(6) that could have been brought pursuant to any
one ofthe first three subsections, the time limit is three months, and the court has no discretion to
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extend that time,
Hut, the eourt is now persuaded, based on the facts of this case and the very recent Utah
Court of Appeals decision, Osvgucra v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2003 UT App 46
(February 21,2003), thai Rule 60(b)(6), URCP, provides a clear basis for relief from the default
judgment separate from grounds that may be asserted under the first three subsections. As the
court explained at the hearing, there is no doubt in this court's mind that the entry of default
results solely from court crrot, ptobabty even more manifestly than was the case in Oseguera.
Notwithstanding plaintiffs assertion that the default was proper because the responsive pleading
was late, at the date the clerk signed the default certificate (November 25,2002) and at the date
the court signed the default judgment (November 26,2002), a responsive pleading had been
filed- The responsive pleading may not have been physically in the court's file, but that was the
court's fault, ' Tito critical point is defendant had not "failed to plead or otherwise defend* (Rule
55(a), UUCP) at the time the default was sought,
In such a case, the clerk is not empowered to enter default, and there is ultimately no
basis for a judgment, and P & B Land makes it clear that the default is "improper or illegal, and
voidable." 751 P,2d at 277, It makes no sense to consider such a judgment illegal and voidable
if the court is nevertheless precluded from voiding the illegal judgment because defendant did
not comply strictly with a three month deadline. That is particularly true when, as here, the
deadline was missed by a relatively short time, and to some extent that was because plainli ffdid
not give prompt notice of the judgment.
The court still believes there may be u basis to set aside pursuant to Rule 60(a), URCP,
under facts such as these and/or under the court's inherent powers to correct its own errors,
particularly in light of the direction given by the Oseguera court:
When the trial court's mistakes-not counselVare the reason a judgment is
improvidently entered and the entry goes undetected, even if it remains undetected
for some time, the court should be anxious to whatever needs to done to fix the
mislakc as soon as it is called to the court's attention.
Wat Para, 12,
Despite this belief, based on its reconsideration of the availability of Rule 60(b)(6),
t JRC1\ and based on the court's determination that defendant clearly acted within a reasonable
time after becoming aware of the default judgment, the court need not reach alternative bases,
For 11 ic foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to set Aside default Judgment be and hereby is

1

Plaintiff may argue that the pleading was deficient in some way, but that is properly a
subject of another motion.
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GRANTED mid the Motion filed November 25,2002, is the responsive pleading to which
plaintiff may direct any future motions. To the extent the defendant's Motion seeks
consolidation of this case with the earlier filed case before Judge Medley, that Motion must be
di reeled lo Judge Medley. This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court and no further
Order is required.
DATED this 12'" day of June, 2003.

Court Judge
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE

MINUTES
PROBATE MINUTES

OF GARY G. PAHL
Case No: 003901101 EF
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Date:
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April 6, 2005
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PRESENT
Petitioner's Attorney: HALA L AFU JR
RAY G MARTINEAU
Other Parties: SANDRA K WEEKS
ROBERT HENRY COPIER
Video
Tape Number:
2:07 pm

Counsel stipulate that the summary judgment is withdrawn. Counsel
argues the order to show cause. The Court takes the order to show
cause issue under advisement and will render a written ruling. Mr
Copier argues the issue of the undertaking. Ms Weeks gives opposing
arguments. The Court orders the motion for the undertaking is
denied. Mr Copier makes a motion in regards to rule 11. A rule 11
motion has not been filed, and therefore denied. Mr Copier makes a
motion in regards to the ruling on 6/12/03 be vacated. The Court
orders the motion to vacate is denied. Ms Weeks makes a motion to
stay any remaining pending motions until a ruling on the order to
show cause. Mr Copier stipulates to the motion.
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